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The Indus Waters Treaty, a long-standing agreement between India and Pakistan governing the sharing of the Indus River system, has once again come under scrutiny. Recent events, including the Pahalgam attack and India's subsequent notice to Pakistan for renegotiation in January 2023, have brought the treaty to the forefront of bilateral relations. This treaty, which has endured for nearly 65 years, divides the Indus river system into the 'Eastern Rivers' (Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi) allocated to India, and the 'Western Rivers' (Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab) for Pakistan. While both nations have, at times, expressed dissatisfaction with the treaty, claiming it is unfair or too generous to the other, the treaty's complexities and implications are often misunderstood. This article delves into the intricacies of the Indus Waters Treaty, examining its historical context, current challenges, and potential avenues for renegotiation, drawing upon insights from Uttam Kumar Sinha, a Senior Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. The central question explored is whether the treaty has been fair to India and what the path forward might entail, considering the evolving geopolitical landscape and the pressing need for sustainable water management in the region. The analysis considers the historical context that shaped the treaty, the specific terms and conditions governing water allocation, the mechanisms for dispute resolution, and the potential impact of external factors, such as China's activities in the region. By examining these elements, the article aims to provide a nuanced understanding of the Indus Waters Treaty and its significance for India-Pakistan relations and regional stability.
The Indus Waters Treaty, signed in 1960, was a product of its time, reflecting the political and economic realities of a newly partitioned subcontinent. As Uttam Kumar Sinha points out, the context in which the treaty was negotiated has changed significantly since then. Population growth, increased irrigation demands, and alterations in the hydro-geomorphology of the region necessitate a reevaluation of the treaty's terms. While Pakistan received a larger volume of water under the treaty, primarily from the 'western rivers,' India secured the exclusive use of the 'eastern rivers,' which has been crucial for irrigation projects in Punjab, Haryana, and Rajasthan. These projects, including the Bhakra Nangal dam and the Indira Gandhi Canal, have significantly contributed to India's agricultural development. In return for Pakistan receiving the larger volume from the western rivers, India was entitled to certain uses on these rivers, including domestic use, non-consumptive use, agricultural use, and hydroelectric power generation. However, India has not fully utilized these entitlements, particularly the right to create water storage capacity. While the treaty allows India to store up to 3.6 million acre-feet (MAF) of water on the western rivers, the current storage capacity is only about 0.7 MAF, primarily achieved through the Salal and Baglihar dams. The completion of the Pakaldul dam is expected to increase this capacity to 0.8 MAF. It's crucial to recognize that the treaty was primarily negotiated by civil engineers who adopted a pragmatic and utilitarian approach to the Indus Basin. The division of the rivers into eastern and western categories, rather than volumetric allocations, simplified the negotiation process and made it possible to reach an agreement. A volume-based approach would have required negotiating six separate agreements, a task that would likely have been insurmountable.
The concept of keeping the Indus Waters Treaty 'in abeyance' does not equate to blocking water flow to Pakistan, as some sections in Pakistan have alleged. Instead, it signifies India's intention to focus on optimizing the provisions of the treaty related to the western rivers. India lacks the storage capacity to completely prevent water from flowing into Pakistan, but it can undertake 'sediment flushing operations' from existing dams. This strategic maneuver sends a strong message to Pakistan that a continuation of the status quo is no longer tenable. Historically, India has been a responsible upper riparian state, adhering to the due process outlined in the treaty for all its hydropower projects. However, New Delhi is now signaling that revised terms are necessary for the treaty to remain in effect. When renegotiating the treaty, India should prioritize two key aspects: the grievance redressal mechanism and the incorporation of advancements in dam-building technology. The existing dispute resolution mechanism, outlined in Article IX of the treaty, involves a three-level process, starting with the Indus Commissioners of India and Pakistan, then escalating to a World Bank-appointed Neutral Expert, and finally to the International Court of Arbitration (CoA) in The Hague. Pakistan has frequently exploited this mechanism to delay Indian dam and hydroelectric projects, objecting to projects such as the Salal Dam, dragging the Baglihar project to a Neutral Expert, halting the Tulbul navigation project since 1987, and forcing the Kishanganga project to arbitration. While India ultimately prevailed in the Kishanganga arbitration, it faced imposed restrictions.
To address the issue of Pakistan's frequent recourse to international arbitration, India should advocate for a bilateral dispute resolution mechanism within the revised treaty, mirroring its stance that all bilateral issues with Pakistan should be resolved bilaterally. The article highlights a telling anecdote: during the treaty's earliest hearings, India sent eight engineers, while Pakistan sent two engineers and 176 lawyers. This illustrates Pakistan's strategy of internationalizing the issue and portraying India as misusing its upper riparian position. The revised treaty should include provisions to prevent such tactics. Furthermore, the treaty's prescriptive nature regarding India's dam-building activities needs to be revisited. Dam-building technology has advanced significantly since the treaty's inception, and India should renegotiate the treaty to incorporate these advancements. The Indus River originates in Tibet, raising concerns about potential Chinese interference in the water issue between India and Pakistan. Currently, satellite imagery and other information suggest that China is not building dams on the Indus. While China is a skilled dam-builder, it is unlikely to build a dam on the Indus solely to spite India if it does not serve domestic purposes. However, India remains a lower riparian state with China on the Brahmaputra River, where China is planning to construct a 'super dam,' which has raised concerns in New Delhi. To address water-related tensions with China, India must strengthen its capabilities on the Brahmaputra while forging strategic lower-riparian partnerships with Bhutan, Nepal, and Bangladesh. This unified front will be crucial in engaging China on transboundary water concerns, a task made more challenging by the fragile and shifting dynamics in the region. Therefore, a comprehensive and strategic approach is needed to navigate the complexities of the Indus Waters Treaty and ensure equitable and sustainable water management for both India and Pakistan.
In conclusion, the Indus Waters Treaty, while historically significant, requires renegotiation to address contemporary realities and ensure fairness and sustainability. India should prioritize bilateral dispute resolution mechanisms, incorporate advancements in dam-building technology, and strategically engage with neighboring countries to manage transboundary water resources effectively. The future of the Indus Waters Treaty will depend on the ability of India and Pakistan to engage in constructive dialogue and find mutually acceptable solutions that address the evolving needs of both nations. Failure to do so could exacerbate tensions and further destabilize the region. A cooperative and forward-looking approach is essential to securing the long-term water security and stability of the Indus Basin. The renegotiation should focus on transparency, data sharing, and joint management of the Indus River system to promote trust and prevent future disputes. The inclusion of climate change considerations is also crucial to ensure the treaty remains relevant in the face of increasing water scarcity and unpredictable weather patterns. By adopting a comprehensive and collaborative approach, India and Pakistan can transform the Indus Waters Treaty from a potential source of conflict into a foundation for regional cooperation and sustainable development. The active participation of all stakeholders, including local communities and civil society organizations, is essential to ensure that the renegotiated treaty reflects the diverse needs and perspectives of the Indus Basin population. The success of the renegotiation will depend on the political will and commitment of both governments to prioritize long-term stability and prosperity over short-term political gains. The Indus Waters Treaty has the potential to serve as a model for transboundary water management in other regions facing similar challenges, but only if it is modernized and adapted to meet the evolving needs of the 21st century.
Source: Has the Indus Waters Treaty been fair to India, and what is the way forward: An Expert Explains