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Pakistan’s recent rhetoric regarding the Brahmaputra River and its potential weaponization by China against India represents a significant escalation in regional tensions, albeit one largely perceived as a desperate and ultimately hollow threat. The core of the issue stems from Pakistan's anxieties surrounding the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) and its apparent desire to internationalize the water dispute by involving China. This attempt at leveraging Beijing’s influence highlights the complex geopolitical dynamics at play, underscoring the imperative for India to remain vigilant and proactive in safeguarding its water security interests. The genesis of this escalating rhetoric lies in Pakistan’s dissatisfaction with India’s stance on the IWT, a treaty that has governed water sharing between the two nations for decades. Frustrated by perceived Indian intransigence, Pakistani officials have resorted to what can only be described as thinly veiled threats, suggesting that India's actions could provoke retaliatory measures from China. Specifically, Rana Ihsaan Afzal, a senior aide to Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, explicitly warned that India’s suspension of the IWT could prompt China to block the flow of the Brahmaputra River into India. This alarmist statement, echoed by Victor Zhikai Gao, a Chinese official, underscores the underlying fear that Pakistan seeks to exploit China’s control over the Brahmaputra to pressure India. However, the practicality and feasibility of such a scenario remain highly questionable, prompting a closer examination of the geographical, economic, and political realities involved. The Brahmaputra, a vital transboundary river, originates in Tibet, flows through India’s northeastern states, and eventually merges with the Ganges in Bangladesh. For India, the river is a lifeline, providing essential water resources for drinking, agriculture, energy generation, and flood management. Approximately 30% of Assam’s irrigation and hydropower needs are met through the Brahmaputra and its tributaries. The absence of a binding water-sharing agreement between India and China, unlike the Indus Treaty, creates a vulnerability that Pakistan seeks to exploit. China's ambitious plans to construct a super hydropower dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo (the Brahmaputra's Tibetan name) near Medog, just before it enters India, have further amplified these concerns. This proposed dam, potentially the world's largest, could significantly alter the river's flow, impacting agriculture, hydropower generation, and water availability in India's northeastern states. While China is obligated under a 2013 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to share hydrological data on the Brahmaputra and the Sutlej rivers with India during the monsoon season, it has ceased sharing real-time data since 2022, undermining disaster management efforts in India's northeast and violating the spirit of transboundary cooperation. Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma has vehemently criticized Pakistan’s threat narrative, dismissing it as a “manufactured threat.” He argues that even if China were to reduce the Brahmaputra’s flow, it could actually help mitigate the annual Assam floods, as the majority of the river's flow is generated within India itself. Sarma emphasizes that only 30-35% of the Brahmaputra’s total flow comes from China, primarily through glacial melt and limited Tibetan rainfall, while the remaining 65-70% originates from torrential monsoon rainfall in Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Nagaland, and Meghalaya. Major tributaries like the Subansiri, Lohit, Kameng, Manas, Dhansiri, Jia-Bharali, and Kopili further contribute to the river's flow, along with additional inflow from the Khasi, Garo, and Jaintia Hills. At the India-China border (Tuting), the flow of the river is approximately 2,000-3,000 m³/s, while in the plains of Assam like Guwahati, the flow swells to 15,000-20,000 m³/s during the monsoon season.
The feasibility of China completely “blocking” the Brahmaputra is also highly doubtful. Diverting a river of this magnitude is an immensely complex and challenging undertaking, both geographically and economically. The Brahmaputra carries massive volumes of water and sediment, and attempting to divert it through tunnels in the eastern Himalayas would be an engineering feat fraught with seismic and environmental risks. Any diversion would not only impact Bangladesh but could also potentially flood Chinese territory if mismanaged. Moreover, such an action would have significant political ramifications. Unlike Pakistan, India enjoys strong diplomatic relations and is not diplomatically isolated. Any aggressive water manipulation by China would be perceived as a violation of international norms, triggering backlash from downstream countries like Bangladesh and undermining China’s Belt and Road Initiative narrative of “peaceful development.” Despite the improbability of a complete blockage, India cannot afford to be complacent. China's dam at Medog, if constructed without transparency, could be used to manipulate seasonal flows to India, exacerbating droughts or floods. The absence of a legally binding treaty with China over transboundary rivers further underscores the need for vigilance. Therefore, India must continue to engage China through bilateral and multilateral channels to ensure transparency and cooperation in managing the Brahmaputra. India has already taken steps to mitigate its vulnerability by accelerating hydroelectric projects on its side of the Brahmaputra, particularly in Arunachal Pradesh. These projects aim to assert riparian rights, build upstream storage capacity, and reduce reliance on Chinese water flows. Furthermore, Indian agencies are enhancing their monitoring of Chinese dam-building activities via satellite imagery to detect any potential threats or manipulations. Pakistan’s attempt to involve China over the Brahmaputra is strategically misguided, as it is not a Brahmaputra riparian state. Its invocation of China is purely rhetorical, an attempt to scare India by leveraging Beijing’s shadow. Islamabad’s fearmongering is a desperate tactic from a state that has seemingly run out of options. However, it serves as a valuable reminder that India must prepare for worst-case scenarios, including Chinese river manipulation, whether deliberate or accidental. This preparation includes continued investments in infrastructure, satellite monitoring, international partnerships, and domestic river basin planning.
In conclusion, while Pakistan’s threats regarding the Brahmaputra River should not be dismissed entirely, they should be viewed with a healthy dose of skepticism. The geographical, economic, and political realities make a complete blockage of the river highly unlikely. However, the potential for China to manipulate seasonal flows through its dam projects remains a legitimate concern that India must address proactively. India needs to maintain a multi-pronged approach, combining diplomatic engagement, infrastructure development, enhanced monitoring, and regional cooperation to safeguard its water security interests in the Brahmaputra basin. This involves strengthening bilateral dialogues with China to establish a more transparent and cooperative framework for managing transboundary rivers. India should also actively participate in multilateral forums to raise awareness about the potential risks of unilateral actions by upstream countries and to advocate for the equitable and sustainable management of shared water resources. Investing in advanced satellite monitoring technologies is crucial for detecting any unauthorized dam construction or water diversion activities along the Brahmaputra. This will enable India to respond promptly and effectively to any potential threats to its water security. Furthermore, India should continue to develop its own hydroelectric projects on the Brahmaputra to assert its riparian rights and to build upstream storage capacity that can help mitigate the impact of any potential flow manipulations by China. Finally, fostering closer cooperation with Bangladesh, a downstream riparian state, is essential for building a regional consensus on the importance of equitable water sharing and for promoting sustainable development in the Brahmaputra basin. By pursuing a comprehensive and proactive strategy, India can effectively manage the risks associated with the Brahmaputra River and ensure the long-term water security of its northeastern states. This requires a commitment to transparency, cooperation, and sustainable development, as well as a willingness to engage in constructive dialogue with all stakeholders. Ultimately, the key to addressing the challenges posed by transboundary rivers lies in fostering a spirit of mutual trust and understanding, based on the principles of equity, reciprocity, and the common good.