Indus Waters Treaty suspension: Implications for Pakistan and regional security

Indus Waters Treaty suspension: Implications for Pakistan and regional security
  • India suspends Indus Waters Treaty after terror attack in Pahalgam.
  • Pakistan rejects India’s move, reiterating the treaty’s binding nature.
  • India cites Pakistan’s support for terrorism as fundamental change.

The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), a landmark agreement signed in 1960, has been a cornerstone of relations between India and Pakistan for over six decades. It survived multiple wars and crises, demonstrating its resilience and importance in managing the shared water resources of the Indus River basin. The treaty meticulously allocates the waters of the six Indus rivers between the two countries, granting the three eastern rivers (Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi) to India and the three western rivers (Indus, Chenab, and Jhelum) to Pakistan. This division, underpinned by detailed regulations and a dispute resolution mechanism, aimed to prevent water from becoming a source of conflict. However, in the wake of the Pahalgam terror attack in April 2025, India announced the suspension of the IWT, marking a significant departure from established norms and raising serious concerns about the future of water security in the region. India’s decision to suspend the IWT is predicated on the argument that Pakistan’s continued support for cross-border terrorism constitutes a “fundamental change of circumstances,” justifying the abeyance of the treaty under international law, specifically referencing the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). This argument hinges on the principle that a treaty can be suspended if the conditions under which it was originally agreed upon have significantly altered. India contends that Pakistan’s alleged state sponsorship of terrorism violates the spirit of cooperation and mutual trust that underpinned the IWT. This is coupled with the long-standing grievances that India has with certain provisions of the treaty, including perceived unfair water distribution and the treaty's inability to adapt to climate change. India has also sent multiple notices to Pakistan since January 2023, seeking renegotiation of specific treaty provisions, invoking Article 12(3) of the IWT, which allows for modifications through a duly ratified treaty. Pakistan has consistently rejected these calls, preferring to adhere to the existing framework and dispute resolution mechanisms outlined in the treaty. This resistance to renegotiation, coupled with concerns over water distribution and climate change, contributed to India's decision to suspend the IWT. The suspension of the IWT has immediate and far-reaching implications for Pakistan. As the lower riparian state, Pakistan is heavily reliant on the Indus River system for its agriculture, power generation, and overall water security. Over 90% of Pakistan's water for irrigation comes from the Indus, and 80% of its irrigated land is dependent on it. The suspension of the treaty raises the specter of India potentially diverting or restricting the flow of water to Pakistan, which could have devastating consequences for the country's economy and livelihoods. Moreover, the suspension of the IWT also halts any ongoing dispute resolution processes related to hydropower projects on the Jhelum and Chenab rivers, such as the Kishanganga and Ratle projects. This allows India to potentially disregard arbitral awards that guarantee certain rights to Pakistan, such as the release of water for the Neelum-Jhelum project. Further, the suspension also removes India's obligation to share river flow data with Pakistan, as seen with the recent Jhelum river flooding. This lack of data can cause significant disruption and hardship for Pakistan. India’s decision to suspend the Indus Waters Treaty is not merely a legal or technical matter; it is a strategic move with profound political and security implications for the region. It represents a significant escalation in tensions between India and Pakistan and raises the risk of further conflict. Pakistan has reacted strongly to India’s decision, asserting that any attempt to stop or divert the flow of water would be considered an “Act of War.” However, Pakistan’s options for responding to India’s move are limited. While it could potentially withdraw from the treaty itself or seek recourse through international legal mechanisms, these options are fraught with challenges and uncertainties. Pakistan’s threat of war, while understandable given its dependence on the Indus, is unlikely to deter India and could, in fact, incentivize India to take more aggressive actions. The suspension of the IWT highlights the inherent asymmetry in the relationship between India and Pakistan concerning the Indus River system. India, as the upper riparian state, possesses the geographical advantage and the capacity to control the flow of water to Pakistan. This asymmetry has historically fueled Pakistani anxieties and insecurities about its water security. The current crisis underscores the urgent need for both countries to engage in constructive dialogue and find a mutually acceptable solution to the dispute. While the suspension of the IWT may be seen as a tactical move by India to exert pressure on Pakistan, it carries significant risks and could have unintended consequences for regional stability. A more sustainable approach would involve renegotiating the treaty to address current concerns, adapting it to the challenges of climate change, and strengthening the dispute resolution mechanisms to prevent future conflicts.

The legal basis for India's suspension of the IWT is complex and subject to debate. While the treaty itself does not contain any provision for suspension or withdrawal, India argues that Pakistan's support for cross-border terrorism constitutes a “fundamental change of circumstances” under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). Article 62 of the VCLT allows for the termination or suspension of a treaty if there has been a fundamental change of circumstances that was not foreseen by the parties at the time the treaty was concluded and which constitutes an essential basis of their consent to be bound by the treaty. However, the application of this principle is subject to strict limitations. The change of circumstances must be radical and must undermine the very foundation of the treaty. Whether Pakistan’s alleged support for terrorism meets this threshold is a matter of legal interpretation and contention. Moreover, even if India could successfully invoke the principle of fundamental change of circumstances, it is not clear that suspension is the appropriate remedy. Article 65 of the VCLT requires a party invoking a ground for terminating or suspending a treaty to notify the other party of its claim and to seek a resolution of the dispute through negotiations or other peaceful means. India has arguably failed to exhaust these options before unilaterally suspending the IWT. The suspension of the IWT also raises questions about India’s commitment to international law and its reputation as a responsible actor in the international community. By unilaterally suspending a treaty that has been in force for over six decades, India risks undermining the principle of pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept) and setting a dangerous precedent for other countries to disregard their treaty obligations. Furthermore, India’s decision could embolden other states to use similar justifications to terminate or suspend treaties based on tenuous grounds, leading to greater instability and uncertainty in international relations. The long-term implications of the suspension of the IWT for water security in the Indus River basin are significant. The treaty has been instrumental in preventing water from becoming a source of conflict between India and Pakistan. Its suspension raises the specter of a water war between the two countries, which could have devastating consequences for the region. Even if a full-scale water war does not erupt, the suspension of the IWT could lead to increased tensions and mistrust between India and Pakistan, making it more difficult to cooperate on other issues, such as counter-terrorism and trade. It could also trigger a scramble for water resources in the region, as both countries seek to maximize their share of the Indus waters. This could lead to environmental degradation, reduced agricultural productivity, and increased social unrest. To avoid these dire consequences, it is imperative that India and Pakistan resume dialogue and find a mutually acceptable solution to the dispute over the IWT. Both countries need to recognize that the IWT is a valuable asset that has served them well for over six decades. While the treaty may need to be updated to address current challenges, such as climate change, it should not be discarded altogether. The best way forward is to renegotiate the treaty in good faith, taking into account the legitimate concerns of both countries. This would require a willingness to compromise and a commitment to finding a solution that is fair, equitable, and sustainable. International mediation could play a useful role in facilitating this process. The World Bank, which has been involved in the IWT since its inception, could offer its good offices to help the two countries reach an agreement. Other international actors, such as the United States and China, could also play a constructive role in encouraging dialogue and promoting a peaceful resolution of the dispute. Ultimately, the future of water security in the Indus River basin depends on the willingness of India and Pakistan to cooperate and find a way to manage their shared water resources in a sustainable and equitable manner. The suspension of the IWT is a setback, but it is not necessarily the end of the road. With political will and a commitment to dialogue, the two countries can overcome this crisis and build a more secure and prosperous future for their people.

The argument that India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) is a well-calculated move to force Pakistan to verifiably and permanently cease its support for cross-border terrorism presents a compelling, albeit controversial, perspective. This viewpoint suggests that India's action is not simply an impulsive response to a singular terror attack, but rather a strategic application of leverage aimed at achieving a broader security objective. The core of this argument rests on the premise that Pakistan’s reliance on the Indus River system creates a vulnerability that India can exploit to exert pressure. By threatening to disrupt or restrict the flow of water, India can effectively raise the stakes for Pakistan, forcing it to weigh the potential economic and social costs of its continued support for terrorist activities against the benefits it derives from such actions. This strategy is based on the assumption that the threat of water scarcity will outweigh the perceived advantages of supporting terrorism, leading Pakistan to re-evaluate its policies and take concrete steps to dismantle terrorist networks operating within its borders. However, the effectiveness of this strategy hinges on several factors. First, it requires India to demonstrate a credible willingness to follow through on its threat to disrupt water flows. This means investing in the infrastructure necessary to divert or store water, as well as signaling a clear commitment to using this leverage if Pakistan fails to meet its demands. Second, it requires Pakistan to perceive India's threat as credible and to believe that the potential consequences of inaction outweigh the benefits of continuing to support terrorism. This perception will be shaped by a variety of factors, including Pakistan's assessment of India's resolve, its own internal political dynamics, and the potential for international pressure or mediation. Third, the strategy must be carefully calibrated to avoid unintended consequences. A sudden or drastic reduction in water flows could trigger a humanitarian crisis in Pakistan, leading to widespread suffering and potentially destabilizing the region. It could also provoke a retaliatory response from Pakistan, escalating tensions and potentially leading to armed conflict. To mitigate these risks, India would need to adopt a gradual and carefully measured approach, signaling its intentions clearly and allowing Pakistan time to respond. Furthermore, it would need to be prepared to offer Pakistan incentives for compliance, such as increased economic cooperation or security assurances. The argument that India's action is a strategic move to combat terrorism also raises ethical and legal considerations. Some critics argue that using water as a weapon is a violation of international humanitarian law and that it could set a dangerous precedent for other countries to use essential resources as tools of coercion. They also argue that it is unfair to punish the entire population of Pakistan for the actions of a few extremists. Proponents of the strategy counter that India has a legitimate right to defend itself against terrorism and that all other options for addressing the problem have been exhausted. They also argue that the potential consequences of inaction – including continued terrorist attacks and regional instability – outweigh the potential costs of using water as leverage. Ultimately, the question of whether India's suspension of the IWT is a justifiable and effective strategy for combating terrorism is a matter of debate. There are strong arguments to be made on both sides. The success of the strategy will depend on a number of factors, including India's ability to credibly threaten to disrupt water flows, Pakistan's perception of the threat, and the potential for unintended consequences. The risks and benefits of this approach must be carefully weighed before proceeding. A diplomatic solution should be sought.

Source: What Happens to Pakistan If the Indus Waters Stop Flowing?

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