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The article delves into the evolving dynamics between India and Pakistan, specifically focusing on how India has managed to neutralize Pakistan's strategy of using nuclear threats as a deterrent against conventional military responses to cross-border terrorism. The author, Manpreet Sethi, argues that Pakistan's reliance on nuclear rhetoric has been a recurring feature of crises with India since Pakistan acquired nuclear capabilities. This strategy aimed to deter India from responding to terrorist activities originating from Pakistani soil, a fact that has gained widespread recognition in the international community. The recent incident involving the terrorist strike on tourists in Pahalgam served as another instance where Pakistan quickly resorted to nuclear saber-rattling after India vowed to retaliate. Pakistan's initial response included a statement from its railway minister, followed by tests of nuclear-capable missiles, including the Abdali and Fatah missiles. After India's military strikes on terrorist infrastructure, Pakistan's Defence Minister Khawaja Asif even declared that the threat of nuclear war was "clear and present". However, India, according to the author, strategically ignored these signals and undertook a "measured, non-escalatory, proportionate, and responsible" action, targeting terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and Pakistan. The Indian Ministry of Defence emphasized restraint in its target selection and execution, specifically noting that no Pakistani military facilities were targeted directly. This distinction between the Pakistani state and the terror infrastructure, however, was perceived by Islamabad as a violation of its territorial sovereignty, leading to retaliatory strikes on Indian military and civilian sites. India responded proportionately to these strikes, targeting Pakistani airfields and air defense systems. The situation further escalated with cross-border firing along the Line of Control. Eventually, Pakistan, after initially declaring and then denying a meeting of its National Command Authority, appealed to the United States to broker a ceasefire. The article highlights that the intervention of the US, prompted by concerns conveyed by Pakistani officials to US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and possibly President Donald Trump, suggests a shift from a hands-off approach to active de-escalation efforts. The core argument of the article revolves around India's success in eroding Pakistan's ability to use nuclear blackmail effectively. This erosion, the author argues, is a result of a series of strategic military actions undertaken by India over the years. These actions include the surgical strikes in 2016 across the Line of Control, the air strikes on Balakot in 2019, and the more recent missile strikes and drone attacks deeper into PoK and Punjab. These actions demonstrated India's willingness to defy the space threshold that Pakistan had previously established as a red line for nuclear use. Furthermore, the author emphasizes the precision and calibration of India's military actions. These actions are designed to minimize collateral damage while effectively targeting terrorist assets and to demonstrate restraint when targeting military sites. This precision is facilitated by the availability of advanced military technology and intelligence, allowing India to execute these operations with minimal risk of escalation. India's strategic approach is likened to a "salami-slicing" strategy, where instead of slicing territory, India is slicing Pakistani assets and infrastructure that are used to inflict damage upon India. This approach prioritizes flexibility, calibrated control over military engagement, and de-escalation, allowing India to remain below Pakistan's stated nuclear redlines. The article also highlights the significance of India's declared "no first use" nuclear doctrine. This doctrine allows India to pursue conventional responses even in areas previously considered off-limits, effectively reclaiming the space for conventional warfare that Pakistan's nuclear strategy sought to deny. Had India adopted a first-use strategy, it would have heightened Pakistan's fears of losing its nuclear assets to a preemptive Indian strike, thus increasing the risk of nuclear escalation. By placing the onus of nuclear escalation on Pakistan and by executing its military actions in a calibrated manner, India avoids posing an existential threat to Pakistan, thereby reducing the likelihood of nuclear use.
Overall, the article suggests that India has successfully challenged Pakistan's nuclear strategy by demonstrating its ability to mount a credible conventional response even in the face of nuclear brinkmanship. By emphasizing that future acts of terrorism will be treated as acts of war, India has forced Pakistan to reconsider its nuclear strategy. The author proposes three possible paths for Pakistan in the future. Firstly, Pakistan may choose to strengthen its conventional military capabilities, acknowledging that the real action takes place in the conventional realm regardless of nuclear posturing. This option would likely involve seeking assistance from China and Turkey to further its military build-up. However, this would impose a significant economic burden on Pakistan, which is already struggling with financial instability and various social and environmental challenges. Despite these challenges, the Pakistan army is likely to garner public support for increased military spending by highlighting the perceived threat from India. Secondly, Pakistan could opt to reinforce its existing nuclear strategy and adopt even riskier approaches to re-establish nuclear deterrence through brinkmanship. This path is considered highly risky and unpredictable, especially given that India has already demonstrated its willingness to call Pakistan's nuclear bluff. Moreover, the international community may become less receptive to such a strategy in the future. Finally, the article suggests a third, albeit less likely, path for Pakistan: pursuing peace with India. This path is currently deemed improbable unless there is a fundamental shift in the power structures within Pakistan, where the military relinquishes its dominant position and stops using India as a pretext for maintaining its control. The choice ultimately rests with Pakistan. In the meantime, India must focus on strengthening its deterrence capabilities at all levels to protect itself from a neighbor that possesses nuclear weapons, harbors terrorist organizations, and denies the threats that both pose. In the long term, however, India should consider ways to incentivize a change in Pakistan's behavior. While past attempts to do so have been unsuccessful, the fact that Pakistan is a permanent neighbor necessitates continued efforts to shape the region in a way that promotes stability and security.
In conclusion, the article provides a comprehensive analysis of the India-Pakistan relationship, focusing on the strategic implications of nuclear deterrence and conventional military responses. It argues that India has successfully eroded Pakistan's ability to use nuclear threats as a shield for supporting terrorism. The author suggests that India has achieved this through a combination of strategic military actions, calibrated responses, and a clear articulation of its nuclear doctrine. While acknowledging the challenges and risks involved, the article offers potential pathways for Pakistan to consider in the future. These include strengthening its conventional military capabilities, adopting a riskier nuclear strategy, or pursuing peace with India. Ultimately, the future of the relationship between India and Pakistan will depend on the choices made by Pakistan and the willingness of both countries to engage in constructive dialogue. The author implies that India’s current strategy of measured responses and deterrence is the most prudent course of action in the short to medium term. However, in the long run, India must also explore ways to incentivize Pakistan to change its behavior and move towards a more peaceful and cooperative relationship. The article serves as a valuable contribution to the understanding of the complex security dynamics in the South Asian region.
Source: India has defused Pak's biggest weapon - its ability to cry nuclear wolf