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The recent elimination of Nambala Kesahava Rao, also known as Basavaraju, the general secretary of the banned CPI(Maoist), in the Abujhmadh area of Chhattisgarh, marks a significant blow to the organization. The fact that this occurred at his headquarters, while he was protected by his special protection force, Company no. 7, highlights the extent of the security forces' success. This event comes on the heels of ongoing operations by security forces at Karregutta in Chhattisgarh, under initiatives like Operation Kagar and Black Forest, further weakening the Maoist presence. The death of their top leader is arguably the most substantial victory for security forces since they launched their offensive against the left-wing extremists (LWE). However, the question remains: Does this event signal the 'Endgame' for the Maoists? Considering their six-decade history, the answer may not be a simple yes. The Maoists have demonstrated resilience in the past. In the early 1990s, following the counter-offensive launched by the unified Andhra Pradesh government with the formation of the elite anti-Naxal force, the Greyhounds, the Maoists, then known as CPI (ML) PWG (People’s War Group), were significantly weakened, reduced to a single dalam. Yet, they managed to regroup and reclaim territory, even establishing a 'liberated zone' in Chhattisgarh. However, security analysts argue that the circumstances of the 1990s differ significantly from the present situation. Back then, the Greyhounds pushed the Maoists from Andhra Pradesh to Chhattisgarh and Odisha, and the police forces in those states were ill-equipped to counter the Maoists' sophisticated guerilla warfare tactics. Today, the landscape has changed considerably. Both Telangana and Andhra Pradesh boast highly trained Greyhounds, recognized as experts in jungle guerilla warfare. Moreover, LWE-affected states like Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh, and Odisha have developed specialized forces to effectively combat the extremists on their own terms. Maharashtra has C-60, Odisha has SOG (Special Operations Group), and Chhattisgarh has the CRPF CoBRA and the DRG (District Reserve Guards). The Andhra Pradesh police shared vital information about Basavaraju’s location with the Chhattisgarh police, which was key to the success of the operation. The collaborative approach and intelligence sharing between states is a significant advantage that was not present in earlier decades. Reaching Basavaraju was no easy feat. He had remained elusive for five decades, never having been arrested since joining the movement. His security detail included a three-layer protection ring, making him a difficult target. Intelligence inputs from various sources, particularly the Andhra Pradesh Police, were crucial. Additionally, the members of the DRG unit who carried out the operation played a vital role. Many DRG personnel were former surrendered Maoists from the region, possessing intimate knowledge of the terrain and Basavaraju’s hideouts. Furthermore, the surrender of several Maoists from Basavaraju’s inner circle, including members of Company 7, provided valuable information and potentially led the forces to his location. The DRG operation was meticulously planned over three months in collaboration with the Narayanpur police and had been underway for several weeks before pinpointing Basavaraju’s location. On the night of the encounter, the DRG personnel unknowingly camped within a radius of 1 to 1.5 km of Basavaraju. A chance firing between Basavaraju’s sentry and a DRG Jawan at dawn triggered a fierce gun battle lasting 30 to 40 minutes, with over 300 rounds fired from both sides. Basavaraju’s identity was confirmed by a DRG Jawan, a former Maoist who had worked alongside him. Security analysts attribute the current challenges faced by the Maoists to key strategic errors. The Maoists operate with two primary divisions: the political wing and the military wing. Since the formation of CPI (Maoist) in 2004, the emphasis has been on developing the military wing, while the political wing has been largely neglected. This imbalance has alienated them from the general public and a significant portion of the intelligentsia, who once provided ideological support. The indiscriminate killing of innocent tribals, falsely accused of being informers, has further eroded public sympathy, leading to open opposition. Internal ideological conflicts within the Central Committee have emerged, with some members advocating for the balanced development of both wings, as the neglect of the political wing has hindered the recruitment of intellectual and educated young individuals. The external support base of the banned party has dwindled to the point that the killing of their top leader has elicited minimal protest. This stands in stark contrast to the events of December 2, 1999, when the elimination of three top leaders by the AP Police in the Koyyur forest area of Karimnagar district in present-day Telangana triggered widespread protests across the state for several days. Documents seized from previous encounter sites reveal that ideological clashes were the primary reason for the expulsion of Kondapalli Seetharamiah, the founder of PWG. He favored a greater focus on the political side, while younger leaders like Basavaraju and Ganapathi prioritized military offensives. A former Maoist acknowledged that the deviation from their core focus has had dire consequences. He explained that the shift towards military tactics has led to the decline of overground organizations such as RSU (Radical Students Union) and RCS (Rythu Coolie Sangam), which once played a crucial role in propagating their ideology and serving as recruitment fronts.
With Basavaraju's death, the Central Committee and Politburo have shrunk to single digits from about 30 members a few years ago, and the military wing has lost its main proponent. The remaining CC members are largely over 60 years of age. Two potential successors are being considered: Mallojula Venugopal, alias Vivek alias Sonu, and Malla Raji Reddy, alias Sattenna alias Sangram. Both are considered to be moderate in their approach and lack Basavaraju's expertise in military strategy. On the other hand, Madvi Hidma, the youngest member of the CC, is seen as too young, brash, and a protégé of Basavaraju, who adheres to the ideology of military dominance. The critical question is whether these potential successors can revitalize the political wing while maintaining control over the military forces. The death of Basavaraju raises significant questions about the future of the CPI (Maoist). The organization faces a leadership vacuum in its military wing, a dwindling support base, and internal divisions regarding strategy. However, the Maoists have demonstrated resilience in the past, and the possibility of regrouping and adapting to the changing circumstances cannot be entirely dismissed. The success of security forces in recent operations, particularly the killing of Basavaraju, has undoubtedly dealt a severe blow to the Maoist movement. The enhanced training and intelligence capabilities of state police forces, along with improved coordination between states, have created a more challenging environment for the Maoists to operate in. The neglect of the political wing and the alienation of the population have also contributed to their weakening. The future trajectory of the Maoist movement will depend on its ability to address these challenges and adapt to the changing landscape. The potential successors to Basavaraju will need to navigate internal divisions, rebuild the political wing, and regain the support of the population. Whether they can achieve this remains to be seen. The debate about whether this is the endgame for the Maoists is likely to continue for some time. While the recent events suggest a significant weakening of the organization, history has shown that they are capable of regrouping and adapting. The success of security forces in maintaining pressure and addressing the underlying issues that fuel the Maoist movement will be crucial in determining its ultimate fate. The article highlights a complex interplay of factors that are shaping the future of the Maoist movement in India. The death of Basavaraju is a significant event, but it is not the sole determinant of the movement's fate. The ability of security forces to maintain pressure, the capacity of the Maoists to adapt and rebuild, and the underlying socio-economic conditions that fuel the movement will all play a crucial role in determining the outcome.
The current state of affairs can be viewed through several lenses. First, from a military perspective, the security forces have undoubtedly gained a significant advantage. The enhanced training, intelligence capabilities, and inter-state coordination have made it increasingly difficult for the Maoists to operate effectively. The use of former Maoists within the security forces, particularly in units like the DRG, has proven to be a valuable asset, providing intimate knowledge of the terrain and the Maoist tactics. Second, from a political perspective, the Maoists' neglect of their political wing and their alienation of the population have significantly weakened their support base. The indiscriminate killings of innocent tribals and the lack of focus on addressing the socio-economic grievances of the marginalized communities have eroded their credibility and legitimacy. The internal divisions within the Maoist leadership regarding strategy and ideology have further hampered their ability to adapt to the changing circumstances. Third, from a socio-economic perspective, the Maoist movement continues to draw support from marginalized communities who feel neglected by the government and lack access to basic necessities such as education, healthcare, and economic opportunities. Addressing these underlying grievances is crucial in order to prevent the resurgence of the Maoist movement. The government needs to focus on inclusive development policies that address the needs of all communities, including those who have historically been marginalized. The article also touches upon the historical context of the Maoist movement, highlighting its resilience and its ability to regroup and adapt in the past. The Maoists have demonstrated a remarkable capacity to survive despite facing significant challenges. The death of Basavaraju is a significant blow, but it is not necessarily the end of the movement. The Maoists may be able to find new leaders, adapt their tactics, and rebuild their support base. The key question is whether they can learn from their past mistakes and adopt a more inclusive and sustainable approach. The article concludes by raising the question of whether the endgame is on for the Maoists. While the recent events suggest a significant weakening of the organization, it is too early to say definitively whether this is the end of the road. The future trajectory of the Maoist movement will depend on a complex interplay of factors, including the effectiveness of security forces, the ability of the Maoists to adapt and rebuild, and the underlying socio-economic conditions that fuel the movement. The article provides a comprehensive overview of the current state of the Maoist movement in India, highlighting the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead. It is a valuable contribution to the ongoing debate about the future of the Maoist movement and the best way to address the underlying issues that fuel it. The discussion on possible successors highlights the internal challenges the group faces. The future of the CPI(Maoist) hinges on whether they can find effective leadership and adapt to the changed circumstances.