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The decision by India to pause the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960 marks a significant escalation in tensions between India and Pakistan. This treaty, brokered by the World Bank, has been a cornerstone of water sharing between the two nations for over six decades, surviving multiple wars and periods of intense political strain. India's move, cited as a direct response to the Pahalgam attacks that tragically resulted in the deaths of 26 tourists, reflects a hardening stance towards Pakistan and its alleged support for cross-border terrorism. The Foreign Secretary, Vikram Misri, explicitly stated that the treaty would be held in abeyance until Pakistan credibly and irrevocably ceases its support for terrorist activities. This bold action raises critical questions about the future of water cooperation between the two countries and the potential consequences for Pakistan, which is heavily reliant on the Indus River system for its agricultural, industrial, and domestic needs.
The implications of pausing the IWT are multifaceted. India now has several options at its disposal, ranging from creating storage facilities on the western rivers – the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab – to withholding the sharing of crucial water flow data. The construction of storage infrastructure would allow India to regulate the flow of water into Pakistan, potentially impacting agricultural output and overall water availability. Withholding water flow data would further exacerbate the situation, making it difficult for Pakistan to plan and manage its water resources effectively. These actions could have devastating consequences for Pakistan's economy and its population, creating a scenario of heightened instability and potential conflict. The historical context leading to this decision is also important to consider. Even after previous major terrorist attacks like Pulwama in 2019 and Uri in 2016, India refrained from taking such drastic measures regarding the IWT. Prime Minister Narendra Modi's statement after the Uri attacks, that "blood and water can't flow together at the same time," hinted at a potential shift in policy, but the recent decision represents a concrete step towards implementing that sentiment. This shift underscores India's growing frustration with Pakistan's alleged inaction in curbing cross-border terrorism and a willingness to use water as a strategic tool in its foreign policy.
Despite the gravity of the situation, the Indus Waters Treaty includes mechanisms for resolving disputes. While the treaty itself doesn't explicitly empower the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to intervene, it establishes a three-tiered resolution process. The first step involves the Permanent Indus Commission (PIC), comprising commissioners from both countries. The PIC serves as the initial forum for addressing disputes related to water sharing. However, if the PIC fails to reach a consensus, the issue can be referred to a neutral expert appointed by the World Bank, as was the case in past disputes over the Kishenganga and Ratle hydroelectric projects. In those instances, the neutral expert sided with India, a decision welcomed by New Delhi. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) emphasizes that the neutral expert's decision is considered final and binding within their jurisdiction. Finally, if both the PIC and the neutral expert fail to resolve the dispute, the matter can be escalated to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague, under the provisions of Article IX of the IWT. Pakistan had previously expressed a preference for approaching the PCA directly in the Kishenganga and Ratle disputes, highlighting the differing perspectives on the most appropriate forum for resolving conflicts.
While India has paused the treaty, completely walking away from it is not a straightforward process. The text of the IWT explicitly states that neither India nor Pakistan can unilaterally cancel or abandon the pact. Article XII of the IWT stipulates that the treaty remains in force until terminated by a duly ratified treaty concluded for that purpose between the two governments. This clause highlights the enduring nature of the agreement and the significant hurdles involved in its termination. Even if India were to attempt to abrogate the treaty, the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which governs the formation, regulation, and termination of treaties between sovereign states, would come into play. Although India is not a signatory to the Vienna Convention, it reportedly takes guidance from relevant sections, adding another layer of complexity to any potential attempt to unilaterally withdraw from the IWT. This creates a complex situation where India has signaled its dissatisfaction and taken action to suspend certain aspects of the treaty, but outright abrogation remains a legally and politically challenging endeavor. This also means that Pakistan cannot unilaterally walk away and must engage India to resolve concerns. The pressure will be on both sides to either negotiate or seek arbitration to prevent a complete breakdown of water sharing which has far reaching consequences.
For Pakistan, the options are limited but not non-existent. They can leverage the existing dispute resolution mechanisms within the IWT, actively pursuing the process through the Permanent Indus Commission, the neutral expert, or ultimately, the Permanent Court of Arbitration. They can also engage in diplomatic efforts with international bodies like the World Bank and other influential nations to exert pressure on India to resume full compliance with the treaty. Pakistan could further argue that India's actions violate international norms regarding water sharing and transboundary resource management. However, these efforts will likely be challenging, given India's position and the justification it has presented for pausing the treaty. Pakistan could potentially face a situation where it is forced to adapt to reduced water availability and manage its water resources more efficiently. This may involve investing in water conservation technologies, promoting water-efficient agricultural practices, and developing alternative water sources. The situation presents a significant challenge for Pakistan, requiring a combination of legal, diplomatic, and practical measures to mitigate the potential consequences of India's actions. The overall stability of the region is also dependent on a resolution that respects the principles of equitable water sharing and avoids further escalation of tensions. The coming months will be critical in determining the future of the Indus Waters Treaty and the relationship between India and Pakistan.
The core issue remains cross-border terrorism. The triggering factor for India pausing the treaty is alleged support of terrorism coming from across the border. It is a signal of shifting policy where the issue has reached a point of no return. This strategy is a risky one for both countries because it has a possibility of further escalating conflict and causing severe repercussions to the relationship between the countries. Both countries must engage to resolve the issues in order to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict, whether that may be through dispute resolution mechanisms, the world bank, or by creating bilateral dialogue on the issues to facilitate cooperation.
In conclusion, the situation remains fluid. It can further escalate into a more severe conflict and create additional disruptions in both countries. The main cause of the disruption is the issue of cross-border terrorism, which needs to be resolved to ensure a long lasting treaty and prevent future situations from arising.
Source: India pauses Indus Waters Treaty: What next for Pakistan?